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ARTICLE

THE EVOLUTION OF MONTANA'S PRIVACYENHANCED
SEARCH AND SEIZURE ANALYSIS:
A RETURN TO FIRST PRINCIPLES
Melissa Harrison*

Peter Mickelson**

This article is intended to examine the Montana Supreme
Court's right to privacy jurisprudence in search and seizure
cases. The thesis of the article is that the court's current
jurisprudence dating from approximately 1993 and continuing to
the present is a return to the intent of the framers of the 1972
Constitution and to the court's jurisprudence in the period
immediately following the passage of the Constitution. We
contend that the period of the 1980's was an aberration. During
* Melissa Harrison is Professor of Law at the University of Montana School of Law
where she has taught Criminal Law, Criminal Procedure, White Collar Crime and
Advanced Criminal Procedure for eleven years. She is currently on leave from the law
school serving as an Assistant Federal Defender in the District of Montana.
** Peter Mickelson graduated from the University of Montana School of Law in 2002
where he was a member of the Law Review. He is currently law clerk to the Honorable
William Leaphart of the Montana Supreme Court.
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that period, the court switched to a search and seizure analysis
more in line with that of the United States Supreme Court. The
First Part discusses Montana's early search and seizure analysis
focusing on the period before and right after the passage of the
1972 Montana Constitution. Part II discusses cases from the
1980's and focuses on how those cases were different than what
had gone before or what is occurring now in the court's
jurisprudence. Part III analyzes more recent cases where the
court has returned to a privacy enhanced analysis.' Part IV
compares cases from these three periods in different search and
seizure situations. Part V suggests more use of the historical
record to support the court's privacy enhanced analysis.
I.

MONTANA'S EARLY SEARCH AND SEIZURE ANALYSIS

The groundwork for Montana's current search and seizure
analysis was laid nearly a half-century before the ratification of
the 1972 Constitution. 2 In 1921, the Montana Supreme Court
stated that Montana's warrant requirement was as trenchant as
the Fourth Amendment, and "expressive of the same
fundamental principles" embodied by the federal requirement,
including the notion that the rights of individuals are to be
protected from government intrusion.3 The court reinforced this
pronouncement in State ex rel. King v. District Court4 by further
defining the search and seizure provision of Montana's 1889
Constitution as absorbing a privacy right, which was neither
mandated by that Constitution nor expressed in the common
5
law.
On the eve of the 1972 Constitutional Convention, the
Montana court again recognized that the search and seizure
analysis implicated a constitutional right to privacy. In State v.
Brecht,6 the court explained that a violation of the federal
privacy right breached the privacy protection of Montana's own

1.
See LARRY M. ELISON & FRITZ SNYDER, THE MONTANA STATE CONSTITUTION, A
REFERENCE GUIDE 52-54 (2001).

2. See Larry M. Elison & Dennis NettikSimmons, Right of Privacy, 48 MONT. L.
REV. 1, 8 (1987). The authors hope that this article will be a worthy follow up to Elison's
and NettikSimmons's very important article.
3. State ex rel. Samlin v. District Court, 59 Mont. 600, 609, 198 P. 362, 365
(1921); see also id. at 9.
4. 70 Mont. 191, 224 P. 862 (1924).
5. Id. at 197-98, 224 P. at 864-65.
6. 157 Mont. 264, 485 P.2d 47 (1971).
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search and seizure provision. 7 According to the court, testimony
based on a defendant's telephone conversation, and overheard
by the witness, was inadmissable under Katz v. United States8
and the common law "right to be let alone," 9 which was
enforceable through the search and seizure provision of the 1889
Constitution.10
The protection against unreasonable searches and seizures
and the concept of privacy became more closely intertwined
following the ratification of the 1972 Constitution. The framers
were inclined to interpret the search and seizure provision of the
new Constitution in conjunction with the privacy guarantee to
produce a more formidable shield for the privacy right."
According to one delegate, § 11 is "the procedural companion of
substantive § 10... [and together] they stipulate that even after
the showing of a compelling state interest the state must abide
by certain procedural guidelines."' 2 Like the Montana Supreme
Court had suggested in King, § 11 served to protect the
Constitution's privacy guaranty, and was, in that sense, a facet
of the concept of privacy. 13 The delegates clearly contemplated
that the right to privacy would shield Montana citizens from
The following are
unreasonable searches and seizures.
statements from the Convention delegates:
We feel that this (the right to privacy clause), as a mandate to our
government, would cause a complete reexamination and guarantee
our individual citizens of Montana this very important right - the
right to be let alone; and this has been called the most important
right of them all. You all had placed on your desk the Montana
Standard's editorial of February 3, 1972. I think it states it very
That, in a nutshell, is why the
imes change.
well.

7. Id. at 270, 485 P.2d at 50-51; see also Elison & NettikSimmons, supra note 2,
at 10.
In his concurring opinion to Katz, Justice Harlan
8. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
articulated the following test for a protected privacy interest as requiring "first that a
person have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that the
expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable'." Id. at 361.
9. Welsh v. Roehm, 125 Mont 517, 523, 241 P.2d 816, 819 (1952).
10. See Elison & NettikSimmons, supra note 2, at 9-10.
11. See id. at 12 (stating that even though the statements of the framers "suggests
that the search and seizure provision and the privacy provision were intended to address
two different kinds of governmental intrusion, comments by the Bill of Rights committee
and other delegates suggest that the two provisions could be applied together in certain
circumstances").
12. 2 MONT. CONST. CONV. TR. 633 (1972).
13. See Elison & NettikSimmons, supra note 2, at 12 (stating that "the search and
seizure provision seems ultimately to have been viewed as one aspect of the more
comprehensive concept of privacy").
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Constitutional Convention delegates in Helena are working on a
new and more modern government charter for Montana. Today,
with wire taps, electronic and bugging devices, photo surveillance
equipment and computerized data banks, a person's privacy can be
invaded without his knowledge and the information so gained can
be misused in the most insidious ways. It isn't only a careless
government that has this power to pry: political organizations,
private organizations, private information gathering firms, and
even an individual can now snoop more easily and more effectively
than ever before. .

.

.

We think the right of privacy is like a

number of other inalienable rights; a carefully
14
constitutional article reaffirming the right is desirable.'

worded

During the decade or so following the inception of Montana's
"free standing" 15 privacy right, the Montana court adhered to its
earlier decisions in King and Brecht, as well as the sentiment
expressed by the framers, and continued to shape a search and
seizure analysis that was amenable to Montana's privacy
guarantee. The court announced that under Article II, §§10 and
11, Montanans were afforded a greater protection against
government intrusion than was available under the federal
Constitution. Until that time, the court had diverged from
federal doctrines only when underlying provisions of the
Montana
Constitution
differed
significantly
from the
16
counterpart provisions of the United States Constitution.
Under this "dual approach" to constitutional construction, the
court followed federal interpretations of federal constitutional
provisions that mirrored Montana's constitution. 17 Recognizing
that Article II, § 11 is textually identical to the Fourth
Amendment, the court nonetheless started to evade the "dual
approach" by combining § 11 with § 10, and interpreting search
and seizure issues in conjunction with the privacy guarantee, to
create a search and seizure provision, which differed
significantly from the Fourth Amendment.' 8 On this basis, the
court justified its independent search and seizure analysis.1 9
14. 5 MONT. CONST. CONV. TR. 1681 (1972).
15. Mark Silverstein, Note, Privacy Rights in State Constitutions: Models for
Illinois?, 1989 U. ILL. L. REV. 215, 231 (1986).
16. See id. at 232.
17. Id. According to the author, the court complied with the "dual approach" only
until 1986 when the doctrine was renounced. See id.
18. See id. at 233.
19. At least one commentator has criticized Montana's approach by arguing that
the textual right to privacy found in Article II, § 10 was derived from federal case law
which itself came from a right found to be implicit in the Bill of Rights. See Ronald K. L.
Collins, Reliance on State Constitutions-The Montana Disaster, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1095,
1128 (1985). The author recalled Justice Shea's refusal to "'march lock-step with
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The effect of the court's independent analysis was apparent
in at least a half-dozen search and seizure cases decided
between 1971 and 1985.20 In defense of its use of the privacy
guarantee, the court offered the following argument:
[the] [a]pplication of this right is as diverse as the components
which make up a free ordered society.... Inasmuch as a citizen's
personality and thoughts are protected as private, so are a
citizen's physical solitude and right to be let alone.... The right
of individual privacy, the right to be secure in one's home, was
prized in Montana even before the adoption of the 1972 Montana
Constitution.... The policy to set a special store on the right of
privacy was expressly enunciated in [Article II, § 10] and
the
21
implementation of that policy was continued by this Court.

However, in conjunction with such references to an
overriding privacy interest, the court demonstrated an
unwillingness to abandon certain established federal search and
seizure doctrines. Of particular significance was the court's
adherence to Katz. In deference to its pre-1972 decisions, the
court continued to apply the "reasonable expectation of privacy"
test when determining which interests were protected under
Article II, § 10.22 To resolve whether a person's right to privacy
had been violated as a result of a State action, the court
considered "whether the party... subjectively expected the
information to be and remain private, and whether society [was]
23
willing to recognize that expectation as reasonable."
Still, the court's application of Katz was by no means
restricted to the scope and meaning assigned to the "reasonable
expectation of privacy test" by the federal courts. Rather, the
Montana court was inclined, on occasion, to "make independent
pronouncements of the United States Supreme Court if our own constitutional provisions
call for more individual rights protection than that guaranteed by the United States
Constitution.'" Id. at 1128. According to the author, Justice Shea's statement implied
that, "textual differences, and textual differences alone, allow independent
interpretations of state law." Id. But see Ellison and Nettiksimmons, supra note 2 at 12.
[C]omments by the Bill of Rights committee and other delegates suggest that
the two provisions could be applied together in certain circumstances. The
committee stated that the search and seizure section.. . is the procedural
companion of substantive § 10... They stipulate that even after the showing of
a compelling state interest, the state must abide by certain procedural
guidelines. Thus, the search and seizure provision seems ultimately to have
been viewed as one aspect of the more comprehensive concept of privacy.
Id. (citing 2 MONT. CONST. CONV. TR. 633 (1972)).
20. Collins, 63 TEX. L. REV. at 1128.
21. State v. Hyam, 193 Mont. 51, 630 P.2d 202 (1981).
22. See Elison & NettikSimmons, supra note 2, at 21.
23. Id. (citing Human Rights Div. v. City of Billings, 199 Mont. 434, 442, 649 P.2d
1283, 1287 (1982)).
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For
use of the reasonable expectation of privacy test."24
example, in cases involving searches of homes, the court
discarded its strict interpretation of Katz by inserting a policy
element that focused on the overriding concern for the privacy of
the home as "the situs of protected private activities."25
Similarly, the court broadened Katz by accounting for the
privacy expectations not only of defendants, but also of persons
26
associated with the defendants, such as family and friends.
In short, Montana's search and seizure analysis had not
taken on an entirely independent character. It seems, that,
during the decade or so following the Constitutional Convention,
the court struggled with two potential search and seizure
analyses, a traditional analysis based on federal doctrines, such
as Katz, and a non-traditional approach which focused on an
apparent heightened privacy right. Rather than adopt one
approach, to the exclusion of the other, the court intentionally
(or not) opted for a balanced measure of each. Thus, Montana's
search and seizure jurisprudence, during this period, may best
be characterized as the beginnings of a purely independent
privacy-based search and seizure analysis in Montana, from a
court that was reluctant to rely solely on § 10, but which
recognized that, in light of Article II, § 10, the traditional federal
doctrines were inadequate..
To this end, the court announced, in Butte Community
Union v. Lewis, 27 that it "need not blindly follow the United
States Supreme Court when deciding whether a Montana
statute
is
constitutional
pursuant to the
Montana
Constitution." 28 And, perhaps, the most revealing statement of
the court's intent appeared in a 1985 search and seizure
decision, in which Justice Shea announced: "As long as we
guarantee the minimum rights guaranteed by the United States
Constitution, we are not compelled to march lock-step with
pronouncements of the United States Supreme Court if our own
constitutional provisions call for more individual rights
protection than that guaranteed by the United States
Constitution."2 9
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
1129.

Elison & NettikSimmons, supra note 2, at 25.
Id.
See id.
219 Mont. 426, 712 P.2d 1309 (1986)).
Id. at 433.
State v. Sierra, 692 P.2d 1273, 1276 (1985), quoted in Collins, supra note 19, at
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II. CHANGES IN THE 1980's

If the evolution of Montana's privacy-enhanced search and
seizure analysis can be observed in three distinct episodes, the
middle period, beginning in the mid 1980's and fading sometime
during the early 1990's, consisted of a sort of backlash against
the incorporation of Montana's privacy guarantee into its search
and seizure decisions. Although there was no absolute, express
renunciation of the trend initiated in the mid-1970's, what we
have is a collection of decisions from this period that
demonstrate a re-examination of the significance of Article II, §
10 and its place in search and seizure law. 30 In other words, if
viewed as a continuum, Montana's search and seizure analysis
has steadily become more observant of the State's privacy
guarantee, with the exception of this series of cases decided
during the mid 1980's, in which the court reaffirmed its
willingness to follow the direction of the federal courts in
matters of criminal procedure.
At least one author has commented that by refusing to rely
on Article II, § 10, the Montana Supreme Court "expanded the
powers of law enforcement authorities in this period." 3 1 This
expansion was particularly evident in the court's surveillance
decisions. Eliminating the warrant requirement for certain
types of monitoring, the court adopted a rationale, also
expressed by the federal courts, that in any conversation, one
party assumes the risk that the other party to the conversation
might have consented to the monitoring or recording of the
conversation. 32 Thus, the court had rejected the notion of a
reasonable expectation of privacy in one's conversations. 33 This
is even though prior to the 1972 constitution, Montanans had
such a right. 34 This overruled a long line of cases which had
held otherwise and is expressly opposite to statement of the
constitutional convention delegates who spoke very negatively
on the issue of electronic surveillance. 35 Another example of the
court's jurisprudence in the 1980's is State v. Kelly, 36 where the
court decided a search and seizure case based entirely on federal
30.
31.
(1985).
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

See Silverstein, supra note 15, at 233.
Id. The author was referring to State v. Long, 216 Mont. 65, 700 P.2d 153
State v. Brown, 232 Mont. 1, 8, 755 P.2d 1364, 1369 (1988).
Id.
See State v. Brecht, 157 Mont. 264, 270, 485 P. 2d 47, 50 (1971).
See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
205 Mont. 417, 668 P. 2d 1032 (1983).
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cases without even referring to the right to privacy clause.
The court's surveillance decisions suggested not so much a
lack of interest in Montana's heightened privacy right, but
rather a preference for firmly rooted federal doctrines. Perhaps,
a more acute example of this was the court's abandonment of the
fundamental premise that the right to be free from unreasonable
searches and seizures included searches and seizures conducted
by private citizens. In State v. Long,37 the court overturned six
earlier decisions, to hold that "[c]itizen's rights articulated in the
Constitution proscribed only state action; [and] therefore, if a
private citizen invaded the privacy of another, there was no
violation of the Constitution itself."3 8 The court had based its
decision, in part, on a concept expressed by the federal courts,
that the exclusionary rule was intended only to deter police
39
misconduct, and that its application is limited to that end.
Justice Sheehy's dissent, in that case, demonstrates the
extent to which Long had deviated from the court's earlier
search and seizure cases. According to Sheehy,
Today's opinion has derailed the one vehicle that gave strength
and vitality to the unique right of privacy enshrined in our State
Constitution. Our state right of privacy had meaning and force in

our lives because this Court excluded evidence obtained in
violation of privacy. Until today, it was the proud accomplishment
of this Court, in the several cases today overruled, that enhanced
by judicial decision that the framers proclaimed, that 'the right of
individual privacy is essential to the well being of a free society,
and shall not be infringed without the showing of a compelling
state interest.' Today the vigor of that ringing proclamation has
40
been drained, leaving it merely a hortative form of words.

III. A CONTINUATION OF THE PRIVACY-ENHANCED ANALYSIS IN
THE 1990S

Though Long remains in effect, its language has become
somewhat of an anomaly in light of the court's more recent
search and seizure decisions, which have further delineated the
scope of Article II, § 10 and the effect of Montana's heightened

37. 216 Mont. 65, 700 P.2d 153 (1985).
38. Id. at 69, 700 P.2d at 156 (overruling State v. Van Haele, 199 Mont. 522, 649
P.2d 1311 (1982); State v. Hyem, 193 Mont. 51, 630 P.2d 202 (1981); State v. Helfrich,
183 Mont. 484, 600 P.2d 816 (1979); State v. Sawyer, 174 Mont. 512, 571 P.2d 1131
(1977); State v. Coburn, 165 Mont. 488, 530 P.2d 442 (1974); State v. Brecht, 157 Mont.
264, 485 P.2d 47 (1971)).
39. Id. at 71, 700 P.2d at 157.
40. Id. at 73, 700 P.2d at 158.
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privacy right on the State's search and seizure jurisprudence.
The supreme court has recognized, and continues to
acknowledge, that the privacy guarantee is a necessary
component of a search and seizure analysis. With the exception
of Long, and an assortment of surveillance decisions, the court
never strayed too far from this principle. As in earlier decisions,
the relevance of § 10 in Montana's search and seizure analysis
was assumed.
For the court, the new task - and what
distinguishes this last half-decade of cases - involved an attempt
to further define the impact of § 10, and the extent to which the
privacy interest could become a primary rationale in search and
seizure cases. Thus, in State v. Siegal,41 the court offered a
blueprint for future search and seizure decisions, commenting
that
[wihile we analyze most search and seizure questions implicating
Article II, § 11 of Montana's Constitution under traditional Fourth
Amendment principles enunciated by the federal courts and
adopted
in our own case law, in certain instances where
Montana's constitutional right of privacy, Article II, § 10, is also
specifically implicated, we must, of necessity, consider and address
the effect 42of that unique constitutional mandate on the question
before us.

The court also quoted from State v. Solis 43 :
There has been unnecessary emphasis on distinguishing right to
privacy cases from search and seizure cases. The right to privacy
is the cornerstone of protections against unreasonable searches
and seizures. Thus, a warrantless search can violate a person's
right to privacy and thereby violate the right to be free from
44
unreasonable searches and seizures.

The court then quoted extensively from the Verbatim
transcripts of the Constitutional convention. These excerpts are
cited elsewhere in this paper. 45 The court thus concluded that:
In the face of th[e] history of Article II, § 10, we are compelled to
conclude that the use of thermal imaging as a criminal
investigative tool is the very sort of technology against which
Article II, § 10 of the Montana's Constitution was enacted to
46
guard.

As the statements from Siegal indicate, the court, again,
deliberately incorporated the privacy guarantee of § 10 into the
41.
42.
43.
44.

281 Mont. 250, 934 P.2d 176 (1997).
Id. at 264, 934 P.2d at 184.
214 Mont. 310, 316, 693 P.2d 518, 521 (1984)
Siegal, 281 Mont. at 191, 934 P.2d at 276.

45.

5 MONT. CONST. CONV. TR. 1681 (1972).

46.

Siegal, 281 Mont. at 277, 934 P.2d at 192.
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requirement of § 11, and created an independent search and
seizure analysis distinct from federal law. In this sense, with
decisions such as Siegal, the court began to consider, and
implement the privacy guarantee not so much as an adjunct to
search and seizure decisions, but as an independent reason for
avoiding the limitations of federal search and seizure doctrines,
and otherwise directing the court's search and seizure analysis.
In Siegal, the court applied the two-prong expectation of
privacy test of Katz, and finding that the defendant had asserted
an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy, the court added
that the warrantless infringement of the defendant's privacy
also required a compelling government interest to survive the
court's review.4 7 One author has argued that with this modified
Katz test, the court used § 10 "as merely a supplement to § 11 in
the second prong of its Katz analysis, [thereby] deny[ing] the
privacy section any content distinct from search and seizure
protection; that is under the Siegal approach, § 10 has no
independent vitality."48 It seems that the court's search and
seizure analysis embodied a compromise with federal law rather
than an outright rejection of the parameters set forth by the
United States Supreme Court in its own search and seizure
decisions.
Although the distinction between federal precedent and
Montana's search and seizure law might, in some instances,
seem artificial, the court's intent to establish an independent
search and seizure analysis has been, and continues to be,
unyielding. Thus, the threshold consideration in any search and
seizure decision provides that, when analyzing search and
seizure issues that implicate Montana's privacy right, the court
will apply Article II, §§ 10 and 11 together, and separate from
the restrictions of the federal Constitution. This specific privacy
right does not have a federal constitutional counterpart, and
therefore, assures Montanans broader protections than does the
federal constitution. In turn, the privacy right dictates that,
under the Montana Constitution, the range of valid warrantless
searches is narrower than the corresponding range under the
49
Fourth Amendment.
47. Id. at 278, 934 P.2d at 192.
48. William C. Rava, Toward a Historical Understanding of Montana's Privacy
Provision, 61 ALB. L. REV. 1681, 1712 (1998). The author of this article criticizes the
Siegal decision for relying too heavily on the Katz analysis and not crafting an
independent right to privacy jurisprudence.
49. See State v. Hardaway, 2001 MT 252, & 57, 307 Mont. 139, & 57, 36 P.2d 900,
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IV. DEVELOPMENTS IN MONTANA'S SEARCH AND SEIZURE
ANALYSIS, INCLUDING A COMPARISON OF EARLY AND RECENT
STATE CASE LAW
A. The Automobile Exception
The automobile exception to the warrant requirement is one
of several doctrines implicated in cases involving searches of
automobiles. First articulated by the United States Supreme
Court in Carroll v. United States,50 the exception dictates that
the warrantless search of an automobile is permissible if
supported by probable cause that the automobile contains
contraband. 51 In Carroll, the Court based the exception on a
distinction between houses and cars and, specifically, the
mobility of the latter. 52 According to the Court, the "Fourth
Amendment has been construed.., as recognizing a necessary
difference between a search of a store, dwelling house or other
structure.., and a search of a ship, motor boat, wagon or
automobile.., because the vehicle can be quickly moved out of
[a] locality or jurisdiction. . . ."53 In United States v. Ross 54 and
South Dakota v. Opperman,55 the Court further delineated this
rational, stating that warrantless searches of cars are
56
indispensable because the "nature of an automobile in transit"
produces "circumstances of such exigency that, as a practical
necessity, rigorous enforcement of the search warrant
57
requirement is impossible."
If mobility provides the foremost justification for the
exception, a supplemental theory exists in what the Supreme
Court recognizes as a diminished expectation of privacy in an
automobile. California v. Carney58 offers, perhaps, the most
salient discussion of this privacy rationale, as it is applied by the
federal courts. Carney involved the warrantless search of a
parked motor home, in which the defendant was suspected of

& 57.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

267 U.S. 132 (1925).
See id. at 153.
Id.
Id.
456 U.S. 798 (1982).
428 U.S. 364 (1976).
Ross, 456 U.S. at 806.
Opperman, 428 U.S. at 367.
471 U.S. 386 (1985).
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operating a "drugs for sex" business. 59 On information that the
defendant had invited a minor into the motor home, and had
offered the child marijuana in exchange for sex, DEA agents
entered the vehicle without a search warrant, and during a
60
cursory inspection of the interior, discovered the contraband.
Following an unsuccessful attempt to suppress this evidence, the
defendant was convicted of possession of marijuana on a plea of
nolo contendere.6 1 On certiorari review, the Supreme Court held
that under the automobile exception, the warrantless search of
62
the motor home did not violate the Fourth Amendment.
The holding in Carney, necessitated - or facilitated - a
different rational than had been used in Carrol, Ross, or
Opperman. In Carney, the Supreme Court found that the
requirement of a warrant to search a defendant's motor home
was negated by the defendant's diminished expectation of
privacy in the vehicle. 63
Noting that the particular
"configuration" of a vehicle may contribute to this diminished
privacy expectation, the Court found that "even in cases where
an automobile [is] not immediately mobile, the lesser
expectation of privacy resulting from its use as a readily mobile
vehicle justif[ies] application of the vehicular exception." 64 The
Court recognized that a motor home may function as a
residence, but declined to infer a privacy interest from that fact.
Instead, the Court explained that the source of the diminished
privacy expectation in a motor home is the same as that of a car:
its ready mobility and "the pervasive regulation of vehicles
capable of traveling on public highways. '65 Thus, the Court
determined that the defendant had a reduced expectation of
privacy in his motor home, in part, because it was readily
mobile, and "so situated that an objective observer would
conclude that it was being used not as a residence, but as a
6
vehicle." 6
59. Id. at 388.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 388-89.
62. Id. at 394.
63. Id. at 391-92. The Court focused less on the mobility prong of the exception,
and turned, instead, to a discussion of the defendant's privacy interest. The Court
implied that the absence of a privacy interest in the motor home "stemm[ed] from its use
as a licensed motor vehicle subject to a range of police regulation inapplicable to a fixed
dwelling." Id. at 393.
64. Carney, 471 U.S. at 391-92.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 393.

https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol64/iss1/9

12

2003

SEARCH AND SEIZURE

257

Harrison and Mickelson: The Evolution of Montana's Privacy-Enhanced Search and Seizure Analysis

The Montana Supreme Court first addressed the automobile
exception in State v. Spielman,6 7 and adopted, without
modification, the federal standard for applying the exception.
Spielman involved the warrantless search of a car that the
defendants used to flee the scene of a robbery. 68 Police searched
not only the passenger compartment, but also the trunk, where
they found a black medical bag, which they presumed was
stolen. 69 On appeal from their conviction of robbery and firstdegree burglary, the defendants argued that the search of the
car had exceeded the plain view doctrine. 70 The Montana court
disagreed, concluding that even without a warrant or plain view,
the search was valid under the automobile exception because
police "had information which was.., particular and reliable;
[and] which matched the defendant's, their clothing, and their
automobile ... .,"71 Relying on Chambers, the court stated that
the exception is appropriate for a "search... conducted on an
automobile traveling on a public highway, pursuant to
descriptive information known to the law enforcement officers

conducting the search.

."..",72

After Spielman, the court applied

the automobile exception with regularity during the 1970's and
1980's.
Beginning in the 1990's, the court began to focus on the
exigency requirement and to state that actual exigency was
required in automobile cases. 73 In State v. Elison,74 decided in
2000, the court reconsidered - and rejected - the idea that there
was an express automobile exception as such. In Elison, the
court concluded that, notwithstanding its earlier decisions, the
automobile exception would no longer afford an avenue for
circumventing the warrant requirement of the Montana
Constitution. 75 Elison dictates that "a warrantless search of an

163 Mont. 199, 516 P.2d 617 (1973).
67.
68. Id. at 201-02.
69. See id. at 202.
70. Id. at 203.
71. Id. at 206.
72. Id. at 203.
73. See State v. Allen, 256 Mont. 47, 51, 844 P.2d 105 (1992) (stating that "the
'automobile exception'... 'requires two things (1) the existence of probable cause to
search; and (2) the presence of exigent circumstances, that is, that it was not practicable
under the circumstances to obtain a warrant.'" (citations omitted)). See also State v.
McCarthy, 258 Mont. 51, 852 P.2d 111 (1993) and State v. Lott, 272 Mont. 195, 900 P.2d
306 (1995).
74. 2000 MT 288, 302 Mont. 228, 14 P.3d 456.
75. Id., $ 54.
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automobile requires the existence of probable cause as well as a
generally applicable exception to the warrant requirement such
as a plain view search, a search incident to arrest, or exigent
76
circumstances."
The warrantless search, in Elison, involved an investigatory
stop, during which police rooted through the defendant's car,
and found marijuana and drug paraphernalia behind the
driver's seat and on the floor board. 77 Vacating the defendant's
conviction, and holding that the search violated Article II, §§ 10
and 11, the Montana Supreme Court explained that the
defendant had a reasonable privacy interest in areas where
"items [could be] stowed in any automobile beyond the purview
of the public," and that the warrantless search of the automobile
invade[d] this legitimate interest."7 8 According to the court,
"even assuming compelling state interests may be implicated,
'the State may not invade an individual's privacy unless the
procedural safeguards attached to the right to be free from
unreasonable searches and seizures are met'." 79 For this reason,
the court concluded that "Ib]ecause of the legitimate privacy
interests implicated and the invasive and generally overbroad
nature of the state's intrusion on these interests, the search of
an automobile requires more than merely the existence of
probable cause to believe it contains evidence of a crime."8 0
The court in Elison expressly rejected the United States
Supreme Court's reduced expectation of privacy analysis of
automobiles. The court stated:
We do believe that when a person rides in an automobile, that
person accepts that their actions and any items left uncovered on
the dashboard or on the seat are no longer private because of their
public visibility. Even in Montana, when persons leave the
privacy of their home and expose themselves and their effects to
the public and its independent powers of perception, it is clear that
they cannot expect to preserve the same degree of privacy for
themselves or their affairs as they could expect at home....
However, when a person takes precautions to place items behind

76. Id.
77. Id.,
9. Prior to the search, the defendant admitted that he had hidden
marijuana behind the seat. The investigating officer opened the driver's side door and
tilted the front seat forward to find a film canister, which contained the marijuana.
Continuing the search, the officer discovered a paper bindle, a two-inch tube, and a razor

blade. Id.
78.

Id.,

53.

79. Id. (quoting Hulse v. Dep't of Justice, 1998 MT 108,
961 P.2d 75, 34).
80. Id., 54.
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or underneath seats, in trunks or glove boxes, or uses other
methods of ensuring that those items may not be accessed and
viewed without permission, there is no obvious reason to believe
that any privacy interest with regard to those items has been
surrendered simply because those items happen to be in an
automobile. Furthermore, there is no reason to believe that the
'pervasive and continuing governmental controls and regulations'
to reduce someone's expectation of
of automobiles could serve
81
privacy in items so stowed.

B. Search Incident to Arrest
In its most imprecise form, the search incident to arrest
exception to the warrant requirement provides that "[w]hen an
arrest is made, it is reasonable for the arresting officer to search
the person arrested in order to remove any weapons that the
latter might seek to use in order to resist arrest or effect his
escape."8 2 However, with respect to its scope, the doctrine has
evolved dramatically during the last forty years. Before 1969,
warrantless searches incident to arrest extended to the area in
the possession or control of the arrestee, including, as in United
States v. Rabinowitz,8 3 a desk, safe and file cabinets located the
arrestee's office.84 In Chimel v. California, the United States
Supreme Court rejected this interpretation, and modified the
85
doctrine to apply only to that area within an arrestee's reach.
Chimel involved, perhaps, the most liberal use of the search
incident to arrest exception: a search of the defendant's entire
house.8 6 And, according to the Court, "[t]he [warrantless] search
went far beyond the petitioner's person and the area from within
which he might have obtained either a weapon or something
that could have been used as evidence against him.... The
scope of the search was, therefore, 'unreasonable' under the
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments .... 8 7 In 1973, the United
States Supreme Court adopted a bright line rule in United
8 9 That bright
States v. Robinson, 88 and Gustafson v. Florida.
line rule is that it is the arrest itself which applies the
81.
82.
83.

Id., 51 (emphasis added).
Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762-63 (1969).
339 U.S. 56 (1950).

84.
85.

Id. at 60-61.
Chimel, 395 U.S. at 768.

86.
87.

See id. at 753-54.
Id. at 768.

88.

414 U.S. 218 (1973)

89.

414 U.S. 260 (1973)
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justification for the search; no further justification is needed. 90
Montana's search incident to arrest exception requires a
similar, albeit more regimented analysis dictated by statute as
permitting a warrantless search only for purposes of protecting
the police, preventing escape, or discovering contraband or
instrumentalities used in the commission of an offense. In
addition, the Montana Supreme Court has consistently declined
to apply the doctrine absent one of these exigent circumstances.
Only once did the court stray from the statutory analysis to
apply the federal rule articulated in Robinson and Gustafson. In
State v. Ulrich,91 the court concluded that a neutron activation
test for gunpowder residue "was within the permissible scope of
a search incident to a lawful arrest under the Fourth
92
Amendment."
The court has since characterized Ulrich as an aberration,
and has adhered to the general rule that "the scope of a
warrantless search incident to arrest must be commensurate
with its underlying purpose of preventing an arrestee from using
any weapons..., escaping, or destroying any incriminating
evidence... ."-93 Thus, in State v. Hardaway, the court overruled
Ulrich, and held that the warrantless, post-arrest swabbing for
blood amounts to an unreasonable search in violation of the
Article II, §§ 10 and 1194... because it was not done for one of
three allowable purposes: (1) protecting the officer from attack;
(2) preventing the person from escaping; or (3) discovering and
seizing the fruits of the crime. 95 Hardaway involved facts
similar to Ulrich. Following his arrest in connection with a
burglary, the defendant was detained in a county jail where
police swabbed his hands for a blood sample to compare with
blood found at the crime scene. 96 On appeal, the defendant
argued that by swabbing his hands after the arrest, the police
had conducted an unreasonable search. 97
The Supreme Court agreed with the defendant, finding that
no exigent circumstances existed for the search, and therefore,

90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.

Robinson, 414 U.S. at 235.
187 Mont. 347, 609 P.2d 1218 (1980).
Id. at 352, 609 P.2d at 1221.
Sate v. Hardaway, 2001 MT 252, 57, 307 Mont. 139,
Id.,
57, 59.
Id.
Id., TT 3-9.
Id., 12.
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no justification for the failure by officers to obtain a warrant. 98
The court stated that "consistent [with the] trend toward
protecting the privacy interests of our citizens ... specific and
articulable exigent circumstances are required to justify and
render lawful such a search."99
C. Open Fields
The United States Supreme Court first articulated the open
fields doctrine in Hester v. United States,10 0 holding that the
Fourth Amendment, which protects "'persons, houses, papers,
and effects,' is not extended to the open fields." 10 1 Relying on
common law property concepts, the Court discerned that open
fields are separable from curtilage, and, by implication, excluded
from Fourth Amendment protections by virtue of its lack of
10 2
proximity with the home.
Since Hester, the Court has modified the common law
rationale for the open fields doctrine to include a Katz-based
In Oliver v. United States,10 3 the Court
privacy analysis.
concluded that because open fields are so accessible, "the
expectation of privacy in open fields is not an expectation of
04
privacy that society would recognize as reasonable.'
According to the court, "open fields do not provide the setting for
those intimate activities that the [Fourth] Amendment is
intended to shelter from government interference .... There is
no societal interest in protecting the privacy of those activities,
such as the cultivation of crops, that occur in open fields."10 5 On
this basis, the Court upheld the warrantless search and seizure
of marijuana growing on the defendants' farm, and stated that
"an individual may not legitimately demand privacy for
activities conducted out of doors in fields except in the area
immediately surrounding the home."10 6 Oliver, and earlier
decisions, do not suggest that the Court has abandoned the
property distinction between open fields and curtilage. Rather,
the Court has used the Katz test to reinforce that distinction by
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.

Id., 59.
Id., 9 57.
265 U.S. 57 (1924).
Id. at 59.
See id.
466 U.S. 170 (1984).
Id. at 179.
Id.
Id. at 178.
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defining, as objectively unreasonable, any expectation of privacy
07
in open field.'
The Montana Supreme Court readily adopted this analysis
in State v. Charvat,0 8 a 1978 case involving the warrantless
search of the area surrounding a defendant's abandoned ranch
house. 109 Acting on information that the defendant was growing
marijuana on his ranch, police entered the defendant's property,
without a warrant, and discovered marijuana plants in an old
corral, located fifty yards from the defendant's deserted home. 1 0
The officers returned with a warrant, and searched the property
more thoroughly, finding, near the corral, a collection of plywood
sheets covered with freshly picked marijuana."' At trial, the
defendant moved to suppress the contraband as illegally
seized. 1 2 The motion was denied, and on appeal from a
conviction for selling and possessing dangerous drugs, the
defendant argued that the marijuana was seized from an area
constitutionally protected against unreasonable searches and
113
seizures.
Echoing the language of Hester and subsequent federal
decisions, the Montana court determined that although the
defendant had expressed a subjective expectation of privacy in
the area surrounding his ranch house, the expectation was not
objectively reasonable because "the marijuana plants were not
in an area where any expectation of privacy exists and thus not
a subject of the Fourth Amendment protection."" 4 The court
drew from Katz to determine that while the area surrounding a
dwelling is private, what remains is inherently public, and
"'[w]hat a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his
own house or office, is not a subject of the Fourth Amendment
protection'."1" 5 In support of its conclusion that the defendant
did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy, the court noted
that the marijuana was displayed out in the open, on property
that was abandoned, in disrepair, and accessible to anyone. 1 6
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
(1967)).
116.

See id. at 184.
175 Mont. 267, 573 P.2d 660 (1978).
Id. at 268, 573 P.2d at 661.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 268, 573 P.2d at 661.
Charvat, 175 Mont. at 272, 573 P.2d at 663.
Id. at 271, 573 P.2d at 662 (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351
Id.
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Charvat demonstrates that, for a time, the court was willing
to rely solely on the federal definition of the open fields doctrine.
During the two decades following Charvat, the court continued
to recognize the doctrine, applying the Charvat analysis to
unfenced property observable from adjacent roads 117 or from a
distance (e.g., through a spotting scope). 118 Then, in 1995, the
court altogether rejected the doctrine, and overruled Charvat
and its progeny. In State v. Bullock," 9 the court offered the
following rule for searches of open fields, stating that:
[iln Montana a person may have an expectation of privacy in an
area of land that is beyond the curtilage which the society of this
State is willing to recognize as reasonable, and that where that
expectation is evidenced by fencing, 'No Trespassing,' or similar
signs, or 'by some other means [which] indicate[s] unmistakably
that entry is not permitted ... entry by law enforcement officers
120
requires permission or a warrant.

The court based this new protection for open fields on a
presumption that the distinction previously drawn between open
fields and curtilage tended to subvert the explicit privacy
guarantee of Article II, § 10 of the Montana Constitution. 121 In
support of its use of § 10, the court returned to the observations
of State v. Sawyer, 22 that the states are not restricted by limits
placed on constitutional rights by the federal courts, and that
Montana's explicit privacy right necessitates a stricter search
23
and seizure requirement than that of the Fourth Amendment.
Bullock involved the warrantless search of an area around
the defendant's cabin, where police observed the carcass of an
unlawfully poached bull elk. 124 According to the court, the
defendant demonstrated at least a subjectively reasonable
expectation in privacy in the area around his cabin by moving
the building away from an adjacent road and into a forested
area, fencing off his property, and limiting access to a single
gate at which the defendant had posted "No Trespassing"
signs. 125 According to the court, these "numerous precautions"
indicated that the defendant's "expectation of privacy was
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.

State v. Dess, 201 Mont. 456, 655 P.2d 149 (1982).
State v. Bennett, 205 Mont. 117, 666 P.2d 747 (1983).
272 Mont. 361, 901 P.2d 61 (1995).
Id. at 384, 901 P.2d at 75-76.
Id. at 383-84, 901 P.2d at 75.
174 Mont. 512, 571 P.2d 1131 (1977).
See Bullock, 272 Mont. at 384, 901 P.2d at 75.
Id. at 365-66, 901 P.2d at 64-65.
Id. at 384-85, 901 P.2d at 76.
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reasonable," and entry onto the property by police amounted to
an unreasonable search and seizure in violation of the warrant
126
requirement of the Montana Constitution.
D. Surveillance
The impact of Article II, § 10 on Montana's surveillance law
has fluctuated considerably - particularly on the issue of
consensual participant wiretapping. In State v. Brecht, (a pre1972 Constitution case) the Montana Supreme Court held that
to admit testimony of a private citizen obtained by listening over
an extension phone to the defendant's conversation with a third
party violated the search and seizure provision of the 1889
1 27
Constitution.
In State v. Brackman,128 the court concluded that Article II,
§§ 10 and 11 preclude the warrantless monitoring and recording
by police of a conversation between a suspect and an informant
who consented to the eavesdropping. 1 29 The defendant, in
Brackman, argued that to "allow warrantless consensual
participant monitoring would have a 'chilling' effect on citizen
discourse." 130 The court agreed, noting that a decision in favor of
the defendant, and imposing a warrant requirement, would not
create too heavy a burden for the police.' 3' The court added that
"[a] state is free as a matter of its own law to impose greater
restrictions on police activity than those that the United States
Supreme Court holds to be necessary upon federal constitutional
1 32
grounds."
Brackman's notion of a stricter warrant requirement for
electronic surveillance resurfaced in the mid 1980's. In State v.
Solis, 133 the court held that absent exigent circumstances, the
police are required to show probable cause to support the
issuance of a search warrant for eaves dropping. 34 In Solis, the
defendant and an undercover police officer were recorded on

126. Id. at 385, 901 P.2d at 76.
127. See Elison and NettikSimmons, supra note 2, at 10.
128. 178 Mont. 105, 582 P.2d 1216 (1978).
129. Id. at 117, 582 P.2d at 1222.
130. Id. at 115, 582 P.2d at 1221.
131. See id. (stating that "[i]n all of the cases examined, none revealed the
circumstances were so exigent that the law enforcement personnel would not have had
time to obtain a search warrant").
132. Id. at 113, 582 P.2d at 1220.
133. 214 Mont. 310, 693 P.2d 518 (1984).
134. Id. at 319-20, 693 P.2d at 523.
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video conducting transactions involving stolen property. 135 The
trial court suppressed the video, and the State appealed. 136 The
court determined, first, that the defendant exhibited an
expectation of privacy in the video tapes because the recorded
conversations took place in a small, enclosed office where the
137
only other individual present was a friend of the defendant.
In addition, the court found that the defendant's expectation
was reasonable because to rule otherwise would be to "violat[e]
the intent of those who drafted the privacy section of our State
Constitution. 1 38 With regard to the State's compelling interest,
the court stated that "even when the State has such a
compelling interest, the invasion of an individual's privacy may
usually occur only with certain procedural safeguards," namely,
1 39
the requirement of probable cause.
The court then offered the following observation regarding
the relevance of the privacy interest to Montana's search and
seizure jurisprudence. According to the court,
This area of law is confusing because of the numerous approaches
to the right of privacy issue in the case law. There has been
unnecessary emphasis placed on distinguishing right to privacy
cases and seizure cases. The right to privacy is the cornerstone of
protections against unreasonable searches and seizures. Thus, a
warrantless search can violate a person's right of privacy and
thereby violate0 the right to be free from unreasonable searches
14
and seizures.

Then surveillance cases began to follow the lead of United
States v. White,' 4 1 a wiretap case in which the United States
Supreme Court held that the Fourth Amendment permitted the
warrantless monitoring of conversations between a defendant
and a consenting informant. 142 Comparing the informant to a
"police agent who conceals his police connections.., and may
right down for official use his conversations with a
defendant.... ." the Court concluded that the "simultaneous
recording of conversations made by [an] agent or by others from
transmissions received from the agent to whom the defendant is
talking... is constitutionally justifiable ...
[because] one
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.

Id. at 313, 693 P.2d at
Id. at 313, 693 P.2d at
Id. at 314, 693 P.2d at
Id. at 318, 693 P.2d at
Id.
Id.
401 U.S. 745 (1971).
Id. at 751-52.

519.
520.
520.
522.
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contemplating illegal activities must realize that his companions
1 43
may be reporting to the police."
The Montana court offered similar opinions in State v.
Coleman144 and State v. Cannon. 45 Noting the inherent lack of
privacy in telephone conversations, the court, in Coleman, stated
that "it] has never held that a court order is necessary to
monitor a telephone conversation, where one of the parties to
the telephone conversation consents. .. . Neither party to a
telephone conversation can ordinarily see the other. Neither has
any way of knowing whether or not the conversation on the
telephone is being overheard by other parties." 46 The court
affirmed Coleman in Cannon, noting, however, that certain
"tape recordings and transcriptions obtained through the use of
an unauthorized electronic monitoring device may properly be
suppressed on constitutional grounds." 14
In State v. Brown, 148 the Montana court overruled
Brackman, and found that the "warrantless consensual
electronic monitoring of face-to-face conversations by the use of
body wire transmitting device, performed by law enforcement
officers while pursuing their official duties, does not violate the
right to be free of unreasonable searches and seizures nor the
privacy section of the Montana Constitution."149 Brown involved
the warrantless recording of the defendant and an informant
who had consented to a body wire. 150 The recording took place
when the defendant and the informant met in a hotel room to
complete a drug sale.' 51 On appeal from a conviction for the
criminal sale of dangerous drugs, the defendant argued that,
under Brackman, the right to privacy prohibited this type of
52
body wire recording.
Rejecting the Brackman analysis, as well as the defendant's
argument, the court concluded that the defendant had "no
reasonably justifiable expectation that statements made to
another will be kept private by that person." 53 Recognizing that
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.

Id.
189 Mont. 492, 616 P.2d 1090 (1980).
212 Mont. 157, 687 P.2d 705 (1984).
Coleman, 189 Mont. at 502-03, 616 P.2d at 1096.
Cannon, 212 Mont. at 162, 687 P.2d at 707-08.
232 Mont. 1, 755 P.2d 1364 (1988).
Id. at 8, 755 P.2d at 1369.
Id. at 3-4, 755 P.2d at 1366.
Id.
Id. at 7, 755 P.2d at 1368-69.
Id. at 10, 755 P.2d at 1370.
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"Montana's Constitutional protections have an existence which
is separate from the federal Constitutional protections . . ." the
court noted two additional justifications: first, that the
participants to the conversation had equal interest in the
conversation, whereby either. participant could consent to the
monitoring; and second, that the warrantless electronic
monitoring in this case was not excessive because the
defendant's statements to the informant were freely spoken. 154
Still, a decade after Brown, the court again demonstrated
its willingness to limit the use of surveillance as an investigative
tool, when it blocked the State's use of nonconsensual wiretap
evidence obtained in another jurisdiction. In State v. Lynch, 155
the court stated that "[nion-consensual wiretapping is not
permitted in Montana and any such evidence obtained in
Montana by public officials is not admissible in this State's
56

courts."1

Of course another electronic surveillance case is State v.
Siegal, 157which dealt with thermal imaging. In Siegal the court
quoted the following from the Verbatim Transcript of the
Constitutional Convention.
First of all, we agree that we would go along with an amendment
that would prohibit electronic surveillance in the State of
Montana.... After listening to testimony, after examining briefs
that were submitted to us, after analyzing the situation, it is
inconceivable to any of us that there would ever exist a situation
in the State of Montana where electronic surveillance could be
justified. And the thinking throughout the United States is,
electronic surveillance shall be justified only in matters involving
national security, perhaps in matters involving certain heinous
federal crimes where the situation is such that in those instances
we must risk the right of individual privacy because there is a
greater purpose to be served. But within the area of the State of
Montana, we cannot conceive of a situation- where we could ever
permit electronic surveillance. And our intention was - - in
responding to the proposed amendment; that we would not object
to it - - was to allow an amendment that would prohibit electronic
58
surveillance in the State of Montana. 1

154.

Id. at 9-11, 755 P.2d at 1370-71.

155.

1998 MT 308, 292 Mont. 144, 969 P.2d 920.

156.

Id.,

157.
158.

281 Mont. 250, 934 P.2d 176 (1997).
Id. at 267-77, 934 P.2d at 192.

15.
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E. Standing
The Montana Supreme Court's application of the standing
requirement for challenges to searches and seizures is notably
lenient. The court has construed the requirement as involving
something less than a possessory interest in the place searched
or the thing seized, and more akin to the less restrictive, less
tangible "legitimate expectation of privacy."
And any
modification of the doctrine has simply resulted in further
clarification of the basic idea that standing to challenge a search
and seizure is directly proportional to one's privacy interest.
This particular form of the standing requirement is not
unique to Montana; but rather, is attributable to the United
States Supreme Court. The concept of a non-traditional test for
standing in search and seizure cases was best articulated in
Rakas v. Illinois,159 in which the Supreme Court noted that the
common test for standing, requiring an injury in fact, and the
assertion of one's own legal rights, is somewhat redundant when
applied to the Fourth Amendment, which, by its terms, involves
a strictly personal right. 16 0
According to Rakas, the more
appropriate question, when considering a search and seizure
challenge is whether "the disputed search and seizure has
infringed an interest of the defendant which the Fourth
Amendment was designed to protect." 16
On this basis, the
Supreme Court concluded that "the capacity to claim the
protection of the Fourth Amendment depends not upon a
property right in the invaded place but upon whether the person
who claims the protection of the Amendment has a legitimate
16 2
expectation of privacy in the invaded place.'
The Montana Supreme Court affirmed the Rakas reasoning
in State v. Isom. 16 3 The defendant in Isom was convicted of
felony possession of dangerous drugs following a search of a
159. 439 U.S. 128 (1978).
160. See id. at 140.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 143. Though Rakas is often cited for its rejection of the notion that the
standing requirement involves an ownership interest, the decision is equally significant
for its abandonment of the automatic standing rule set forth in Jones v. United States.
See id. (citing Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 267 (1960)). Before Rakas,
automatic standing, under Jones was available to "anyone legitimately on the premises
where a search occurs.... ." Jones, 362 U.S. at 267. The Court, in Rakas, suggested that
the rule was too broad, and limited its relevance to the facts of Jones. See Rakas, 439
U.S. at 143. In short, Rakas is as much a limitation on the standing requirement as it is
an expansion of the concept.
163. 196 Mont. 330, 641 P.2d 417 (1982).
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home in which the defendant was a guest. 164 The central issue,
on appeal, was whether the defendant lacked standing to
challenge the search and seizure in light of his status as an
overnight guest. The Montana court held that because the
standing requirement is not based on ownership, "the fact that
the defendant was an overnight guest [did] not control a
determination of his standing to contest the legality of the
search of a the residence .
"165
Because contraband was
discovered in an area where the defendant, the sole occupant of
the house, slept and stored his belongings, the defendant had
demonstrated a "reasonable expectation of freedom from
governmental intrusion... ," which served as an adequate basis
16 6
for standing to challenge the search and seizure.
The court expanded Isom in Bullock, affirming the holding
of that case, and adding that, contrary to the federal trend,
standing to challenge a search and seizure would attach to any
defendant charged with a crime involving the element of
possession. 167 The so-called "automatic standing rule" was
earlier rejected by the United States Supreme Court, but had
survived in several state jurisdictions. 168 Thus, the Montana
court adopted language from a New Jersey decision, which
indicated that "where a defendant is charged with an offense in
which possession of the seized evidence at the time of the
contested search is an essential element of guilt," standing is
automatic. 169
Applying automatic standing, the court
determined that the defendant, who was charged with
unlawfully possessing a killed animal, could challenge the
search and seizure of the carcass even though the search and
170
seizure occurred at another's residence.
V.

SUGGESTIONS FOR THE FUTURE.

The present jurisprudence of the Montana Supreme Court

164. Id. at 333-34, 641 P.2d at 419.
165. Id. at 338, 641 P.2d at 421.
166. Id.
167. State v. Bullock, 272 Mont. 361, 371-73, 901 P.2d 61, 67-69.
168. See id. at 372, 901 P.2d at 68.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 373, 901 P.2d at 69. The court affirmed the automatic standing rule in
State v. Parker,stating that, under Bullock, the defendant, a passenger in a vehicle, had
standing to challenge a search of the vehicle because the defendant was charged with
possession of some of the contraband discovered in the car. State v. Parker, 287 Mont.
151, 157-58, 953 P.2d 692, 696 (1998).

Published by ScholarWorks at University of Montana, 2003

25

270

MONTANA
REVIEW
Montana Law
Review, Vol. LAW
64 [2003],
Iss. 1, Art. 9

Vol. 64

reflects the intent of the framers of the 1972 Constitution.
Montana's Constitution history provides rich material to support
the court's independent right to privacy jurisprudence. 17 1 One
author has already criticized the Montana Supreme Court for
inadequate use of history to buttress its right to privacy
jurisprudence. 172 We are forced to agree. State v. Siegal and
more recently State v. Hardaway give the most detailed
historical support for their opinions. However, neither make
adequate use of the rich historical record supporting an
independent privacy based jurisprudence.
The Constitutional Convention prepared numerous studies
with particular attention given to the Declaration of Rights. 173
The study argued that existing federal guarantees were
inadequate and suggested that Montana should supplement
"existing rights provision" and give other new constitutional
status. The study concluded that an express privacy provision
174
should be added.
Perhaps the most powerful statement supporting the right
to privacy is from the Bill of Rights Committee Proposal.
The Committee unanimously adopted this section - similar to
delegate proposal no. 33 - in order to guarantee of privacy. What
it accomplishes is the elevation of judicially-announced right of
privacy to explicit constitutional status. The right has been
guaranteed in case law at the federal level.., and in Montana...
The Committee believes the Constitution should specify that the
only circumstance in which the right of privacy may be infringed is
following the showing of a compelling state interest. This is in
response to the increasing danger of eclipse in an advanced
technological society. The point of this provision is not to prohibit
all invasions of privacy but to require that no invasion of privacy
should occur until and unless a compelling sate interest has been
established.
The Committee proposed a broad provision in this area to permit
flexibility to the courts in resolving the tension between public
interests and privacy. It is hoped that the legislature will have
occasion to provide additional protections for the right of privacy
in explicit areas where safeguards are required. An example of a
potential legislative subject matter can been seen in delegate
proposal no. 124 which prohibited requiring submission to a lie
detector or similar test as a condition of employment. 175

171.
172.
173.
174.
175.

See Rava, supra note 48, at 1692-94.
See id. at 1691-92, 1709-12.
See Rava, supra note 48, at 1692-93.
Id. at 1693-94.
5 MONT. CONST. CONV. TR. 632-33 (1972).
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In Siegal, the court did cite Verbatim Transcripts.
However, a look at other important right to privacy cases
reveals very little reliance on constitutional history. In State v.
Bullock, citing no history whatsoever, the court stated "based on
this State's Constitution, and its expressed regard for individual
privacy, we decline to follow the U.S. Supreme Court's
distinction between curtilage and open fields ... -"176 The court
then analyzed prior Montana cases and cases from other
jurisdictions to support its conclusion that the State's strong
tradition of respect for individual privacy required the court to
overrule prior cases recognizing the concept of "open fields." In
Elison, the court cites Bullock and cases cited therein for the
proposition that "Montana's unique constitutional language
affords citizens a greater right to privacy and therefore broader
protection than the Fourth Amendment.' 77
In State v.
Hardaway, the opinion includes a lengthy discussion of prior
case law but again no specific reference to Montana's
Constitutional history.
The previous discussion is not meant to criticize the
foregoing cases but to suggest that the state's rich constitution
history could enhance the courts rational for its privacy
enhanced jurisprudence which is true to the intent of the
framers of the Montana Constitution. In fact, Montanan's
Constitutional history would lend support to a right to privacy
jurisprudence that was even more independent of federal norms
than is currently the case. Montana's Constitutional history
suggests the following: (1) At each stage of Montana's
Constitutional history (even prior to 1889, dissatisfaction was
expressed over the scope of federal protection (2) The remedy
was to adopt changes that were "more reflective of Montana's
unique character" (3) The intent was always on the expansion of
individual rights. 178 By using the records of the history of both
1889 and 1972 beyond that of the statement of the delegates, the
court's statement regarding the scope of privacy right could be
buttressed. 17 9 Truly the Court could convincingly demonstrate
that its current jurisprudence is truly a return to first
principles.

176.
177.
178.
179.

State v. Bullock, 272 Mont. 361, 376, 901 P.2d 61, 71.
State v. Elison, 2000 MT 288, 46, 302 Mont. 228, 46, 14 P.3d 456,
See Rava, supra note 48, at 1698.
See generally, 1 MONT. CONST. CONV. TR. 71-72 (1972).
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